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Chapter 1: Introduction
Statement of the Problem: The Real World
Today, one need not conduct research or seek academic studies to witness a growing
segment of our global population: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Simply by
turning on the television, picking up the front page of a newspaper or magazine, or going onto
Facebook, Twitter or some other website, the faces and stories of refugees are front and center.
Media and the press tell the story of what’s happening “over there” through captured images and
stories of strangers and culturally “different” people; they paint a picture of a group of persons in
need of saving. Frequently, this depiction is reminiscent of colonization.
For example, refugees could easily represent the subject of a discussion about the
increasing resistance to colonial authority by the 19th century Chinese: “(t)hese were people who
experienced constant denial and humiliation because of their colour or origins…” (Duara, 2004,
4) (note: italics added for emphasis). Colonizers believed they were on a “civilizing mission”
and, like the Reverend Frederick Farrar, they believed that these people had “not added one iota
to the knowledge, the arts, the sciences, the manufactures, the morals of the world” (Duara, 80)1.
When looking at today’s refugees, does the public really think any differently than the Reverend
Farrar did back in 1867? Is it any different with foreign aid: has foreign aid assumed the role of
the colonizer, assisting refugees with the disbursement of food rations, water, shelter, and
medical supplies, but rarely providing the refugee with an avenue to independence?

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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! Found in “Contested Hegemony” (Adas, M.), Ch. 8, footnote 1: ‘Aptitudes of the races’, Transactions of the
Ethnological Society of London 5 (1867):120, in Decolonization: Perspectives From Now and Then (Duara, 2004).
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While there are many agencies focused on assisting refugees, many lack sufficient
supplies and resources and therefore, are limited in their reach and impact. The agency
RefugePoint carries a tagline, “A Lifeline for Forgotten Refugees”2 which not only suggests
these limitations but underscores what seems to be common knowledge: not all refugees can be
assisted with the existing infrastructure.

While organizations like UNHCR claim to assist

refugees with a variety of items, ranging from shelter to food and water to refugee registration,
organizations seem lacking in the area of assisting refugees with becoming productive and
contributing members of their local economies. When asked about this topic, a consistent
response from NGOs was that they offered training to aid the refugee in their re-entry of the
workforce and that they also held skills sessions to assist the refugee in broadening the types of
jobs for which they would be qualified. But what benefits are there from trainings and workshops
if the person is not considered suitable for employment by a society?
When examining this theme further, I found that some NGOs, like UNHCR, had
experimented with the use of microfinance for refugees, as had commercial banks in poorer
countries such as Ecuador. Unfortunately none boasted success. Microfinance, or the lending of
small loans to poor people who lack access to formal banking services, has been viewed as a
transformative tool for the fact that it provides the “unbanked” poor, the same people who are
commonly a part of an informal society, like refugees, with access to formal banking.
Microfinance loans are typically purposed for business-related expenses tied to the upstart of a
business or the purchase of supplies for a business, though some loans are used for consumption
or household expenses. Microfinance serves as a bridge for the poor to gain access to the formal
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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society, through the formal financial services industry (Zeller & Meyer 2002). Therefore, if poor
people who live in an informal society can gain access to formal financial services, and as a
result, become part of the overall, formal society, why can’t refugees?

Why couldn’t

microfinance be successfully extended to them?
In researching this question, I found that the most frequent reason for refugees not being
included in microfinance programs traced back to social capital. Most organizations tended to
look at social capital in the traditional definition, which is the definition commonly used by the
World Bank:
Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion
is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable.
Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the
glue that holds them together. (from: World Bank, Social Development, Social Capital
Library, 2011)3
The World Bank, and each organization that has adopted this definition, considers social capital
to be the “glue”, a component that is critical to economic prosperity and development and
essentially, the element that holds society, and its various institutions, together.

When

considering microfinance, many microfinance organizations will not work with refugees because
they believe the refugee lacks a connection to the society in which they are now living, as well as
they lack a sense of responsibility to contribute to the development of that society- in other
words, they lack social capital. These microfinance organizations also typically focus on the
probability that the refugee represents a high flight risk: that the refugee will suddenly move
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Definition from World Bank website, Social Capital tab; also cited in Poverty Capital, Roy, 2010 (66).
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away and fail to repay their loan (Bartsch 2002; Jacobsen 2004), which again, points back to the
refugee’s lack of social capital. Such shortcomings, as well as failed microfinance pilots which
targeted refugees (Jacobsen 2004), make it difficult to argue that refugees actually do represent
potential microfinance borrowers.
However, through the work of Ananya Roy (2010), I found an opening to look beyond
traditional definitions and past failures. Roy states that “(g)roup-based, women-focused
microfinance is seen to activate and mobilize “good” social capital.” (2010, 67). If social capital
can develop through group-based microfinance, might there be a way to provide microfinance to
refugees and not only assist them in business but provide a platform from which they might build
social capital?
In order to examine these questions, I created a case study that would examine groupbased, microfinance programs in Tulcán, Ecuador, an area close to the Colombian border and
home to both transient and settled Colombian refugees. Additionally Tulcán serves as home to
one of UNHCR/ACNUR’s offices in the border region and also attracts other NGOs providing
assistance to the refugees. During my research, I found that all groups and individuals were
willing to openly discuss their efforts and freely provided feedback on my findings and ideas.
Above all, I found a genuine concern for the refugees and a dedication by all to create a more
effective path that would enable the refugees in becoming more independent and selfsustainable.

4
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Research Methodology
My thesis examines the extension of microfinance to a refugee population in order to
assist them with an economic livelihood and a bridge to addressing their stated needs. I assert
that refugees represent a growing socio-economic force within the global community yet one that
cannot be assisted long-term by the majority of dedicated organizations that focus on refugee
assistance.
The methodology employed in my research was Informal Interviews and Participant
Observation. I conducted informal interviews with professionals from microfinance
organizations, banks, NGOs, Poverty Centers, UNHCR/ACNUR, and local citizens/residents
situated in Ecuador and Colombia. I also employed a Direct Observation methodology for
microfinance borrower meetings, which were divided between village-banking group meetings
and individual loan meetings.
My case study was built on the research that I collected over a 4-5 month period.
Embarking upon this project, I designed three categories from which I would gain information
and data:
1. Informal interviews with professionals and academics who have focused their
research and/or work on the topic(s) of refugees, IDPs, microfinance, the reduction of
poverty, and/or development issues which tie into one (or more) of the previously
mentioned topics.
2. Research conducted during my internship in Ecuador in July 2011 working with the
microfinance institution, Banco FINCA, and meeting with other NGO’s, MFIs, and
other groups relevant to my analysis and this population. This research had the
5
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objective of: a) understanding the existing situation, b) building knowledge about the
organizations and services that are in place to assist the refugees and why they are
doing the work they do (or cannot do), and c) understanding the needs and
experiences of microfinance borrowers who live in the same region from the
perspective of those borrowers.
3. The design and administration of a survey targeting microfinance institutions in, or
near, areas with refugee communities. Through this survey, my objective was to
identify MFIs who were located within the same region as refugees and post-conflict
area and to apply best practices learned through the survey to my case study region.
Specifically my survey sought information surrounding two questions:
a) Does the microfinance institution currently loan to persons defined as refugees
and/or internally displaced persons?
b) If not, under what circumstances might the microfinance institution be willing
to provide refugees with financial products such as microcredit?
The rationale for this analysis stemmed from the existing landscape of microfinance
institutions lending to borrowers who appear more stable than refugees (who have inherent flight
risk, especially in the eyes of a financial organization). Since these organizations range from
conservative to progressive in terms of their business models and approaches, I thought that it
would be reasonable to assume that a survey might result in a collection of unique practices, best
business practices, and past-mistakes which others might learn from. Unfortunately, as I outline
in the next section, I was unable to administer this survey; I did, however, successfully
incorporate the questions I had originally designed for that survey in my Informal Interviews.

6
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Limitations of Case Study
While critical to a refugee’s integration in their new location, the first limitation of my
case study is that it does not explore all of the critical issues that surround refugees, such as the
legislation required to protect refugees in their new countries, the documentation process, formal
versus informal housing, labor markets, and the discrimination, exploitation and abuse of
refugees. I leave these questions to other researchers and agencies which are located around the
world and especially in Colombia and Ecuador. For the purpose of my case study, I narrowed
the scope of my topic to examine if microfinance could serve as an effective tool which would
help the refugee address their most important needs. My focus does not suggest that these other
issues are less important – they are equally, if not more, important. In fact, I would underscore
the need for additional agencies, personnel, resources, and legislation to serve and protect these
people who have risked their lives to migrate to Ecuador; these are people who have left most, if
not all, of their possessions at home in Colombia and are determined to do any type of work in
order to support their families in a new location. They are people from modest means and
generally very poor, rural towns, but they, like anyone, have the right to basic services such as
food, shelter, security, documentation for residency and medical aid. I leave the debates and
revisions of legislation and processes to others; my research focuses on whether or not
microfinance might be extended to refugees in Ecuador and if so, whether it could assist the
refugee in addressing their unmet needs.
A second limitation of my work is that my results are constrained by the length of time
which I had to conduct my observations. While my research spanned five months, from late May
through October 2011, most meetings were conducted once, on average, with unique
7
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participants. As such, my research lacks the benefit of a longer timeframe over which I might
have been better able to assess my findings or compare the research compiled from initial
meetings; a longer timeframe may also permitted for measures of impact to be introduced to the
study to analyze how microfinance affects (or does not affect) the borrower and his/her family.
Additionally, because I had a limited timeframe, I did not have the opportunity for follow-up
meetings with the same interviewees and borrowers. Such meetings may have provided insight
as to whether participants were responding honestly or simply offering responses which they felt
were appropriate for the discussion (or what they thought they should say). Without the
opportunity to meet for a second (or even third) time, which would have introduced a
comparative discussion in my findings, I can only trust (and hope) that people responded
honestly and felt open enough to share their truth.
Finally, while I initially thought a survey would be a contribution to the existing literature
on microfinance and conflict-zones, feedback amongst practitioners was consistently not in favor
of this method because there was a strong opinion that MFIs already receive too many surveys
and questionnaires and that they are understaffed. Additionally there was a strong opinion that
the MFIs which did have time to respond would have a volunteer (who generally would not be in
a position to offer meaningful information) offer the response. There was also an overwhelming
amount of feedback that the timing of my survey intersected with the writing of several very
large grant-proposals. This, again, underscored the time-constraints that the MFIs face,
especially at the time which I had targeted for my survey. Thus, in lieu of a survey, I embarked
upon informal discussions with several MFIs, outside of the region of my case study, to better
understand their points of view on refugees. While these discussions provided useful insight to
the mindset of the MFIs, as well as the structure of, and influences on, the organizations, they did
8
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not offer me the broad understanding of MFIs across multiple conflict and post-conflict zones,
working with or around refugees, which I had originally thought helpful to my analysis. While
there is much literature that has examined these topics, I was unable to contribute to that
discussion. Therefore, on this topic, I rely on the existing research, such as that of Wilson, ElZoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, and Jacobsen, as well as others found in my literature review and
referenced in my Bibliography.

Timeline for Research
There were five stages associated with my research, starting with Stage One and
following through to the completion of Stage Five. The timeline for the entire project spanned
six months, June – early December 2011, and is outlined below. While I served as the sole
researcher on this project, I did receive assistance from multiple employees of Banco FINCA, the
microfinance organization where I interned, especially as they coordinated many of our meetings
with borrowers and partner organizations; I also leaned on my Banco FINCA associates for
periodic translations of more colloquial Spanish and challenging accents.
TASK

TIMEFRAME

Stage One
Identification of Sources for Informal Interviews

May - June 2011

Informal Interviews

June 2011

Design of Database (to store collected data)

June 2011

Stage Two
Participant Observation in Ecuador

July 2011

Informal Interviews in Ecuador

July 2011
9
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Stage Three
Data Aggregation & Input of Observations

August 2011

Continuation of Informal Interviews

August 2011

Follow-up from Interviews

August 2011

Stage Four
Initial Assessment of Data

September 2011

Supplemental Research

September 2011

Final Data Assessment

October 2011

Stage Five
Organization of Project Results

November 2011

Distribution of Project Results

December 2011

Value Proposition of Research
There are four main benefits that potentially will stem from my research. Ideally, my
research will be shared across industry practitioners in the microfinance industry, with
NGO/development groups who are focused on providing assistance to refugees and internally
displaced persons, and with governments seeking to assist their country, or others, during and
after times of conflict. These four benefits are:
1. Contribution to the literature about Colombian refugees; in particular, my research focuses
on an approach through partnerships could enable the refugee to address their own needs.
2. Information about the subset of refugees who migrate from Colombia (due to the conflict in
their home country): while Colombian refugees and the domestic IDP group represent one of
the largest refugee and IDP populations in the world, they rarely have a voice given they

10
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migrate in small groups and are a byproduct of a multi-decade conflict4. I believe my
research can provide useful data about this population, provide a human side to their
situation, and continue to ask the question: what are the most important needs to a refugee,
through their eyes and voices?
3. The use of an existing financial tool (microfinance) with a new borrower profile. This
application, i.e., the use of microfinance, will provide assistance to a refugee population and
in turn, allow them to better function and contribute to the economy in those locations where
they settle;
4. My research will be beneficial to discussions surrounding the installation of microfinance in
new markets, such as with refugees or IDPs and other prospective borrowers who may not fit
the traditional profile with established social capital. I hope that it will expand the mindset of
those people working in microfinance, commercial banks, NGOs, and other entities that
might, one day, be in a position to form, or join, a partnership which seeks to assist refugees
and IDPs.

Looking forward to the next section, Chapter 2, we turn to those themes that intersect the subject
of my thesis: foreign aid, poverty, microfinance and refugees, and a review of the corresponding
literature.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Colombian refugees generally migrate in small groups during the night, so as to avoid being seen by guerrilla
groups, paramilitaries, police, or neighbors.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction: Once Upon a Time
The World Bank began as an idea to provide economic stabilization and reconstruction
following World War II. Founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944
and called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the IBRD began
its business of lending in 1946. In this first year, the IBRD had a membership of 38 countries
(Phillips, 2009). Through the 1950s and 1960s, the IBRD membership grew and by the
beginning of 1970, IBRD had 109 members; twenty years later, at the end of 1990, there were
158 members. Today in 2011, IBRD continues to serve as the main lender within the World
Bank Group, it focuses on world development and poverty alleviation, and has a membership of
187 countries (worldbank.org).
While its initial mandate was focused on the financing of capital-constrained countries
after the devastation of WWII, the World Bank expanded its role in the 1950s to include
assistance to developing countries. It was during this time that they moved beyond their
traditional financing role to include other issues related to economic growth such as
infrastructure projects. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established
under the World Bank Group as a lender to the private sector, and in 1960, the International
Development Association (IDA) was created in response to the Bank’s expansion in order to
provide soft loans and grants to the most-poor countries (Phillips, 2009). Today, the World Bank
Group is comprised of five divisions: the IBRD; the IDA; the IFC; the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established in 1966; and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established in 1988 (worldbank.org). Over its sixty-five years of
12
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history, the World Bank leadership has been varied; currently the Bank is directed by its 11th
president, Robert Zoellick.

World Bank: 1968 - 1991
In the late 1960s, the bank embarked upon a path to broaden the scope of their work,
which included a greater orientation towards poverty alleviation and infrastructure projects; this
shift was created and driven by Robert McNamara when he became Bank President. McNamara
believed that investments and loans could not effectively combat poverty and its related
problems. As Phillips research shows, McNamara felt that “direct, redistributional assistance to
the rural and urban poor was needed, in terms of both finance and know-how” (2009, 8). As
McNamara embarked upon his mission to reform the World Bank, he seemed to identify every
area of the Bank as an area in need of revitalization. Structurally, he implemented a President’s
Council of Vice Presidents, who would serve as his advisors, as well as a body to whom he
would be accountable. Over time, he changed the structure to an Executive Committee, which he
believed would be more responsive to his ideas. In 1971, he implemented his fight against
poverty through “poverty projects” (Phillips, 2009, 137) and served as the main sponsor of
CGAR, the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research. Examining Bank efforts that focused
on poverty-lending projects during the two years, 1968-1970, revealed roughly 5% of the Bank
lending was dedicated to poverty issues; later, in 1979-1980, poverty-oriented lending jumped to
30% of all Bank lending (Phillips, 2009).
Robert Ayres (1983) takes a closer look at the World Bank during the pivotal
McNamara years where it sought to become a poverty alleviator to developing markets. Ayres
work, specifically Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty, sheds light on the
13
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defining role that McNamara assumed as President of the World Bank, pointing out that before
McNamara’s tenure, the World Bank avoided any role as a development agency, and attempted
to behave more like a banking institution. Under McNamara, poverty projects grew in
importance and focus for the World Bank. Ayres offers his arguments based on research and
interviews from former World Bank employees; he also asserts that McNamara attempted to
redefine the purpose of development, aid and the role of the World Bank itself, recognizing that
all were not functioning as they had been intended or designed. This argument is notable in that
it represents the first time a World Bank employee (President!) admitted that things were not
working as they should be. Mild understatement as that might be, what stands out is the
President’s admission that things were not working.
Years later, William Easterly, a former World Bank economist, picks up this argument
and expands upon it. Easterly (2006) not only says, as McNamara recognized, that the
development and aid industry, including the role of many agencies like the World Bank, has not
succeeded, but he likens it to the period of colonization where the colonizer controlled all
decisions and sought to ‘improve’ the lives of the colonists, which did nothing other than further
the interests of the colonizer. In his book, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to
Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (2006), Easterly argues that the West
mistakenly thinks for the Rest (ie, developing countries) and that it fails to get the perspective of
the people it seeks to assist. Easterly points out failed projects and the difference between
“searchers” (people who seek answers based on a discovery-process including market feedback,
competition, and the on-the-ground experience) and “planners” (people who think they have the
answer in advance and implement a course based on that assumed knowledge). He also
underscores a central theme of his research and opinions: the lack of understanding and lack of
14
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accountability by the West and most aid agencies. In his book Reinventing Foreign Aid (2008),
Easterly presents research and arguments to highlight economic development and
microenterprise as areas that can assist the Rest; he advocates the need to teach relevant skills to
the Rest which can be applied in an economic livelihood and therefore, provide them with a
source of income. In considering Easterly’s argument and research, I question why more NGOs
wouldn’t take the approach of pursing strategies that encourage targeted populations to become
self-sustainable and increasingly less dependent on provisions and handouts? Isn’t that the
objective that, ultimately, every NGO says they are working towards?

Development, Aid, and New Approaches
In the literature about development and aid, there is an abundant amount of work
written on, or about, the “dialogue” between Easterly and the economist Jeffrey Sachs, not to
mention the commentaries offered by Easterly or Sachs themselves in response to one another’s
opinions and research. While there are strong distinctions between these two economists, both
share a common concern about world poverty. Easterly (2006) advocates the free market
approach for solving complex problems, and openly criticizes the “throw money at it” approach
which he argues is the pathway taken by most aid agencies. Sachs (2002), on the other hand,
believes that an increase in funding can make a difference and can effectively lift countries out of
poverty and out of the “poverty trap” that so often they fall into. Both Easterly and Sachs, while
perhaps not willingly or openly, find common ground with economic programs such as
microcredit, which both indicate, under the right circumstances, can prove beneficial to a local
community through the creation of economic livelihoods. Such ingredients bode well for a more
defined course towards independence and security.
15
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Another area in which Easterly and Sachs differ is the celebrity “cause-advocate”.
Whereas Easterly openly criticizes those celebrities who adopt causes such as AIDS, claiming
their work results in little, if any, progress for the cause, Sachs aligns himself with celebrities
who campaign for issues that overlap with his own work, such as malaria and poverty
eradication. From a broader perspective, the topic of “celebrity-philanthropist” has received
much attention in recent years, going well-beyond the Easterly-Sachs debate; it has even led to
the manufacturing of new words which classify this special breed and the industry: celanthropist,
celanthropy, philanthrocapitalism, to name a few. With more and more people entering the field
of development, like these celebrities, it is questionable whether more people rallying for a cause
translates to more aid for a charity or “cause”. If more aid is not created or distributed, what
purpose do these celebrity advocates really have?
In the book Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World (2009), Matthew
Bishop and Michael Green examine how a slightly different group of people are also
increasingly getting involved: very wealthy, high-profile people are combining their business
acumen and skills with their significant financial fortunes and they are attempting to combat
social issues and global problems. Bishop and Green provide numerous examples of active,
hands-on, charitable-giving efforts by individuals who are billionaires (Gates, Buffett) and
celebrities (Bono, Oprah). While it is too early in the process to measure the impact of these
actions, philanthrocapitalism represents significant pools of money which are being purposed
towards social issues. In earlier work, Matthew Bishop (2008) also argues that the new breed of
philanthropist is getting into “the trenches”, approaching the “fronts” of social causes by getting
out to where the issues are and attempting to raise awareness of what is transpiring. Stepping
back to analyze their efforts, it appears that they are successful in raising the public’s awareness
16
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(often with the help of their own public relations team) yet the effectiveness of their efforts, as
with celebrities, appears limited, too early to diagnose, or unknown. What is known is that there
are more people involved though this increase has not necessarily translated to more aid for the
people who need assistance.
Ashok Khosla (2008) emphasizes the need to leverage knowledge when approaching
social issues, such as poverty, and the need to scale operations in order to create income and
profit. Khosla’s research asks the question: what economic tool will have the most impact in the
effort to end poverty? The answer which emerges from his work stems from the community that
is being targeted which leads Khosla to become an advocate for community ventures, social
enterprise businesses, and “network enablers”, which provide assistance to a community’s efforts
where/when that assistance is needed. As Khosla argues, similar to Easterly, no one knows what
the community needs more than the community itself. Khosla, being a subscriber to the
principles of the free-market and a venture capital practitioner, calls for the scaling of these
community efforts, into the small and medium enterprise (SME) space.5 Khosla suggests that the
creation of social enterprise businesses within a community could be a possible alternative to
traditional development efforts, such as outright aid/grants.

More on the Topic of Aid
Like Easterly and Sachs, Paul Collier’s work demonstrates grounding in historical data,
statistical trends and economic research. In his book, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

!The SME area is a more expansive effort than microfinance and can potentially have more impact in a community:
the focus is on a large business, such as a factory or food cooperative (i.e., a business with many employees
responsible for a certain level of production, and the business has potential for a minimum threshold profit) – this
differs from smaller, more individualized, businesses associated with microfinance.
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Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (2007), Collier asks the question central
to the Easterly and Sachs debate: “Is Aid Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” (123).
Collier’s findings suggest that aid “improves the opportunities for private investment” (123) but
that it has been overemphasized as a panacea, or cure-all. Collier affirms that aid alone has
limitations, inherent problems and “…will not be sufficient to turn the societies of the bottom
billion around” but that it does offer some value and thus, “is part of the solution rather than part
of the problem.” (123). Collier states that aid is a part of the broad array of instruments and
policies which need to be developed, and from which, solutions may be designed and
implemented by groups such as the G8.
Another point of view about the aid industry is represented by Graham Hancock in,
Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business (1989).
While written nearly two decades before Easterly, Sachs and Collier, Hancock argues that the aid
industry (mainly official aid agencies and some NGOs) is shameless, corrupt and broken and that
it is filled with puffed-up “humanitarians” who face no accountability for their work and
spending decisions. Hancock offers numerous examples to support his allegations and renames
the aid industry, “Development Incorporated” (42). Hancock presents evidence of the spiderweb that aid agencies have created and have become entangled in, which includes projects
ranging from “sanitation, water and sewerage works, ports and airports, trains and boats and
planes, crop spraying,… (to) construction of hotels, mining,… family planning programmes,…
debt relief, balance-of-payments support,... building bridges,… (and) teaching foreign
languages” (42). He argues that the majority of work by aid and development agencies lacks
input from the targeted group which these agencies attempt to assist, and frequently, the efforts
do not result in any known benefit. As Hancock states, more often than not, development
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projects “wreck the lives of the poor” (113) and “… in many countries the poor now see
development ‘as an alien process, something done to them and a waste of effort’” (128).
Dambisa Moyo would have to agree with Hancock. In her book, Dead Aid: Why Aid is
Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (2009), Moyo argues that the pathway to
assist Africa is not through aid but rather through a new approach, based on financing and
economic growth opportunities. She suggests use of market-based solutions such as the bond
market, an expansion of microfinance efforts, wide-scale investment in large infrastructure
projects, and new property laws. She calls for a decrease in aid which would result in a full
stoppage within a decade. Clearly, despite both working for the same employer earlier in their
respective careers (The World Bank), Moyo clearly takes an opposite opinion from Jeffrey Sachs
on the need for more aid in Africa and would like to see an “end date” on the horizon for all aid.

And You Thought Poverty Was Just a Lack of Money?
There is a plethora of information about poverty nowadays, ranging from statistical
work that defines, measures and dissects poverty, to the extensive research, case studies, and
theories that examine root causes, justify the existence (of poverty), and demonstrate the
pathway which will finally reduce or even eradicate poverty all together. The number and
variety of actors in the poverty industry are many, and at times, confusing: NGOs, nonprofits,
for-profits-with-a-social-mission, research centers (frequently associated with colleges and
universities), divisions of corporations dedicated to social causes (many stemming from their
Corporate Social Responsibility focus), family foundations, community foundations, impact
investors, high net worth individuals, celebrities, and the catch-all category, consultants. And
above all, there are the poor themselves, who serve as the central characters of much research
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yet, often, are without a voice or avenue that would include their own participation in efforts that
seek to assist (or examine) them, “the poor”. In recent years, the majority of literature on poverty
has gravitated towards several debates which appear to direct much of the dialogue and studies.
The first debate that appears again and again is the categorization of poverty. How is
poverty defined and categorized? Are these definitions consistent amongst NGOs, researchers,
donors, and other industry participants? Are such categories consistent across regions and
cultures? Can categories truly be adapted based on prices for food across countries; do those
choices have the same meaning for each country and is it really possible to compare regions
using standardized categories? Lanjouw examines these questions in her research, focusing on
the construction of poverty lines that can be used to measure effects of public policy and social
welfare (2001). In his book, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (2005),
Jeffrey Sachs distinguishes between three levels of poverty: “extreme (or absolute) poverty,
moderate poverty, and relative poverty.” (20) As Sachs indicates, the World Bank focuses on
daily income (adapted across regions for purchasing power parity), where people living in
extreme poverty earn $1 day, those who earn $1 - $2 live in moderate poverty. It is assumed that
those who make $2 or (slightly more) a day, live in what he calls relative poverty. Much of
Sachs’ research focuses on the reduction, and elimination, of extreme poverty, which Sachs
believes to be feasible over a defined period of time.
Muhammad Yunus also devises categories in order to dissect poverty on three levels.
As stated in Banker to the Poor (1999), when analyzing a population, he uses the following
categories: P1 as representation of the bottom 20% (“hard-core poor”/absolute poor), P2 as the
bottom 35%, and P3 as the bottom 50% of the population (41). However, unlike Sachs and (to
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some extent) Yunus, Easterly (2006) mocks the use of such metrics, including another widelyused World Bank statistic: the international poverty line, which is measured at $1.25 a day based
on purchasing power parity in 2005. Overall, Easterly is not shy about criticizing much of the aid
industry’s efforts to “fight” poverty, calling it unproductive and wasteful and frequently citing
examples to underscore his points. Thus, his criticism of specific measures seems in character,
and at times, actually demonstrates the importance of having some type of categories as an
agreed-upon language for the industry. I question whether such debates about semantics are
worthwhile or if they simply redirect resources away from addressing the actual problem. Given
the volumes of literature on categories of poverty and the calculation of such categories, it
appears that the industry is somewhat caught up in its own debates, forgetting the people who
they are, in theory, attempting to assist.
A second debate in the literature focuses on whether aid and development programs
have helped – or hurt- the poor. Easterly (2006) asserts that aid has not helped the poor but has,
in fact, contributed to the worsening of their situation. On the other side of the discussion, Sachs
(2005) states that development aid can be effective when that aid is not only large enough, but
provided for a long enough period of time during which poor households can rise above a basic
sustenance level. Easterly and Sachs frequently espouse their respective theories, and generally
disagree with one another on the topic of aid and the need for development programs; research
by others tend to dissect one or both of their arguments, offering more clarity on the work and
writings of either Easterly or Sachs (or both). What stands out when assessing these arguments
is the amount of resources that support each side of the argument while little, in comparison, is
directly allocated to the people who are intertwined in this discussion: the poor.
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In the middle, more or less, of the aid debate, stands Ananya Roy. In her book, Poverty
Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development (2010), Roy encapsulates what she views
as the motivation fueling the extensive attention in recent years (and currently) on poverty, its
statistics, and the vast number of organizations formed to “do something” about poverty. Roy
states:
…there is nothing new about poverty. The issue is how and why at particular historical
moments, poverty becomes sharply visible and serves as a lightning rod for social action
and change. …What is unusual about the present historical moment is that poverty has
become visible as a global issue. The focus has shifted from the modernization of
national economies to the alleviation of the poverty of the “bottom billion,” the 1.4
billion people…living under the threshold of the international poverty line. (6-7)
In other words, Roy asks the question: why has poverty become so “popular”? Unlike Easterly
or Sachs who take a firm stand on the role of aid, Roy takes an approach that leans toward the
acknowledgement of all issues which surround poverty. Roy does not question the impact of aid
or the existence of aid’s destructive wake; instead, she examines the themes surrounding the
participants (such as NGOs, governments, and the poor). Effectively, Roy’s research steps inside
the development world in order to better understand what type of work is conducted (or being
discussed) to improve the lives of the poor and what impact (positive or negative) that work has
or is projected to have. In other words, Roy doesn’t take a side of the debate, but rather, she
attempts to understand the impact that aid has had, for better or worse; her net assessment leans
towards the effectiveness of market-driven solutions for the poor.
In looking at market-driven solutions, microfinance emerges. Microfinance has also
generated much discussion over the last decade and serves as the theme for a third debate in
poverty research. Over the last decade, Muhummad Yunus has been instrumental at increasing
awareness about microfinance and its impact on the poor; his writings, his efforts with his
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microfinance institution, Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, his many speeches, and his selection (on
behalf of Grameen Bank) for the 2006 Nobel Prize for Peace, introduced and spread the notion
that the poor were not only hard working people but they didn’t want direct handouts. Through
his research, Yunus demonstrated that poor people borrow from family, friends, and
moneylenders for expenses including business-related costs, medication, food, emergencyrelated expenses, and wedding dowries. He demonstrated that the high interest rates charged by
moneylenders commonly led borrowers to take out another loan from another creditor, in order
to pay off the more costly loan, and that this often was a continuous cycle that transferred from
generation to generation of the poor. Through the introduction of very small loans with a fixed
interest rate cap (ceiling), Yunus began a microcredit program that involved into Grameen Bank.
Over time, high loan repayments and decreased reliance on moneylenders, coupled with
improvements to borrowers’ diets and increased education of school aged children, served as
indicators that microcredit (through Grameen Bank) was having a positive impact on the lives of
the poor. (1999, 2007).
Research conducted by Martin Greeley (2005) takes the idea of positive impact
stemming from microfinance and analyzes it further: Greeley closely examines eight
microfinance institutions in varying regions (his analysis does not include Grameen Bank). His
research provides evidence that borrowers’ households improve due to the combined approach
that is taken by many MFIs in which they offer loans but also teach the borrower about savings
(the savings program assists the client in both repaying their loan and starting a modest savings
account). Greeley demonstrated that this combination provided the upfront money to improve the
borrower’s household (repairs to the shelter, purchase of material assets in the home) yet also
forced the borrower to save and thereby repay the loan through a disciplined and timely
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approach. However, Greeley’s work also stated that the affect on the poor – the actual impact or
movement away from poverty- was inconclusive; while he noted that all MFIs were willing to
work with him to measure the effectiveness of their work, the MFIs did not have adequate
records that tracked their borrowers over long periods of time. The lack of such records suggests
that there is insufficient data about the progress of the borrowers and therefore one cannot
assume that they have made progress out of poverty (2005). Thus, one might conclude that
microfinance can be beneficial for improving the quality of the borrower’s life though additional
research is required to determine if it carries the impact that Yunus’ work suggests.
Continuing a deeper analysis, Roy, who, as mentioned above, approaches microfinance
from a slightly different vantage point, differentiating between microfinance programs which are
“self-regulating, market-based” and can serve to spur economic growth and independence from
those that are “donor-subsidized” and generally “unsustainable and neocolonial” (2010, 215).
This distinction is important as much research uses the term, microfinance, to denote the full
spectrum of microfinance programs without concern for a critical variable such as the program’s
funding structure; in other words, not all microfinance programs are the same nor do all represent
equal opportunities to reach the poor, thus, they cannot be lumped together under the same
umbrella-term, microfinance. In reality, the funding structure of an MFI is critical in
understanding the MFI:
- donor-subsidized microfinance programs are driven by money from donors and the
strategies that are designed by the donor; this structure can lead to inefficiency or
shortcomings since the MFI must adhere to that strategy to maintain the funding.
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- self-regulating or market-based MFIs are driven by the need to become profitable and
self-sustainable; this structure focuses on loan volume and savings; it is not reliant on
donor-aid for survival.
Digging further into the literature about microfinance, there appears to be an increasing
amount of work focusing on impact, especially in regard to the effectiveness of microfinance
programs. Studies on impact examine if the use of microfinance is, or has been, successful vis a
vis indicators such as the food or housing of the borrower, assessing if there have been
improvements to the borrower’s diet or shelter. However, the literature exposes a lack of
consistency in impact measurement. Zeller and Meyer (2002) argue that the industry’s lack of
agreement on the best methodology for measuring impact, let alone to assess results, leads to
difficulties in making recommendations. Effectively, this shortcoming curtails the industry’s
knowledge of its own impact: how do institutions really know what impact they are having if
methodologies vary by organization? How can a large donor funding multiple microfinance
institutions assess their collective impact if each one has its own form of impact measurement?
While Zeller and Meyer do attempt to measure the reach of a microfinance institution (such as:
reaching the rural poor versus urban poor, and the average poor versus the extreme poor), they
struggle with linking the MFI’s work to impact. Reasons for this difficulty trace back to the
complexity and high costs associated with data collection and methodology (2002). As I review
the literature associated with these challenges I am reminded of the debate about the
effectiveness of foreign aid, its complexity and the costs involved with its data collection and
methodology; it is unclear why more resources are not allocated towards improving methodology
and the processes of data collection versus the theoretical debates. Wouldn’t it make sense to
have tangible evidence to support a debate?
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Indeed, varying forms of methodology exist, ranging from a simplistic verbal
questioning approach to the very expensive and elaborate randomized control trials (RCT), with
each attempting to quantify the impact of microfinance or a related component stemming from
an input tied to microfinance. On the high-end of that spectrum (from a cost and resource
perspective) is the research of Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel, who use randomized control trials
to examine impact in a controlled environment. In More Than Good Intentions (2011), Karlan
and Appel present their latest research, arguing that results can be read in a variety of ways. For
example, they assert that if RCT results are not positive, meaning that if the trial is either
inconclusive or concludes a lack of impact, it is still critical to study the impact of actions and
the targeted attempts of assistance. They state that impact may or may not be measurable through
RCT but that a lack of measurement does not necessarily imply a lack of impact; Karlan and
Appel suggest that all actions have impact, but not everything can be measured. As their book’s
title suggests, the industry surrounding poverty, the development world, the poor, need more
than just the good intentions of a bunch of actors in the space; each needs (and deserves) results,
whether measurable or not, that indicate a change for the better, especially as viewed by the
person living in poverty.

Knock, Knock (Who’s There?)
In examining the literature on poverty, it was apparent that there was a disproportionate
amount of research on the topics detailed above, yet very little work that offered the voice of the
poor. However, several researchers stood apart from the majority. Graham Hancock argues that
the poor are rarely, if ever, included, and offers detailed accounts of the disconnected work of
development agencies “working” with the poor (1989). Deepa Narayan attempts to remedy this
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void, gathering experiences from the poor and from populations across over 60 countries and
regions over the 1990s (2000, 2002). Packed into a lengthy series entitled Voices of the Poor
(2000, 2002), Narayan presents views that stem from conversations with 60,000 poor people
living in 60 countries across the globe. Her research highlights the lack of impact often
associated with NGOs work in a region, as well as their lack of accountability: “(p)oor people
would like NGOs to be accountable to them” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, ix). Through her
research, she also uncovers what poor people desire: “poor people do not want charity but
opportunity” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, 274) and she suggests a new strategy for change, one
that is built on recognition of the realities of the poor and aimed at investing in “development
entrepreneurs” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, 281) who can facilitate positive change. Narayan
also analyzes the “newly” poor: those individuals who are poor as a result of conflict and war,
including internally displaced persons and refugees. In later research, Moving out of Poverty:
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Mobility (2007), Narayan, along with Patti Petesch, offer
research that focused on 500 communities in 17 countries to better understand reasons and
conditions for either remaining impoverished or moving out of poverty. They present evidence
that uphold the belief that inequalities are “perpetuated by the dominant social structures and
values and norms that determine the opportunity structure poor people face” (2) and they
conclude that because of these obstacles in society, it is significantly challenging for poor people
to move out of poverty.
In Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor live on $2 a Day, Daryl Collins,
Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthven (2009) present their findings from a
year’s amount of time working with over 250 poor people and closely analyzing their
relationship with money. This bottom-up research revealed that the poor actually plan for the
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challenges that they face, such as irregular employment, income, and illness/disease, and that
they allocate money to various accounts, including savings, in order to plan to the fullest extent
possible. The significance of these findings is that the poor think no differently than people with
money, which might sound simple, however, the significance of their work stems from the fact
that this hypothesis had not previously been tested so thoroughly (2009). Whereas Muhammad
Yunus may have suggested similar patterns from his own research, his own approach had been
less research-intensive and much more regionally concentrated (1999). Collins, Morduch,
Rutherford and Ruthven demonstrate that the poor borrow and the poor save, with or without
access to microcredit, and they manage their lives around the flow of money, just like everyone
else, rich or poor.

Microfinance: Basic Components
Looking at the debates around development and aid, it appears inconclusive whether aid
can reduce poverty over time. While aid might offer a respite from the extreme cycles of poverty,
it seems questionable that it can eliminate poverty all together. Studies on microfinance
programs, especially those that are “self-regulated” and “market-based”, seem more hopeful as
they appear to generate some economic independence while contributing to the growth of
smaller economies (Roy, 2010). Both of these factors, economic independence and economic
growth, represent outputs that, when combined, might deliver more lasting progress than aid.
And that progress, thus far, appears to be an improvement to the microfinance borrower’s quality
of life, or a shift towards a less-poor lifestyle. But does microfinance really work? Can it break
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the cycle of poverty and “lift people out of poverty”?

6

While there is compelling evidence to

indicate “yes”, there are also arguments to the contrary. To better understand whether or not
microfinance is effective, it is important to examine what microfinance is and what it is designed
to offer.
As Joanna Ledgerwood states in the Microfinance Handbook (1999), a well-know
reference book in the microfinance industry, microfinance “has evolved as an economic
development approach to benefit low-income women and men” (1). Ledgerwood points out that
microfinance generally refers to the provision of microcredit loans and microsavings programs
though often insurance products, trainings (skills, financial literacy), and healthcare services are
packaged into the loan or are distributed by the microfinance institution (MFI). In his research,
Suresh Sundaresan (2008) assesses the models of microfinance that have developed since 1980.
Sundaresan examines four models of microfinance organizations: the NGO, the non-bank
financial institution (NBFI), the rural bank which is part of the nationalized bank, and the village
bank. These models set the stage for microfinance since microfinance institutions fall into one of
these four categories; some MFIs progress from one model to the next, such as starting as an
NGO, advancing (though legal filings) to an NBFI, and sometimes on to the status of a bank
(either rural or village). Banco FINCA in Ecuador is an example of a microfinance institution
that went through these stages in order to offer increased services to their clients7.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

!Microfinance organizations and industry practitioners tend to use the phrase “lift people out of poverty” when
describing the goal(s) of microfinance programs. An example of this common phrase can be found at:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADN074.pdf
8

!During July 2011, I interned at Banco FINCA in Ecuador and learned about their history: they started as an NGO,
evolved into a non-bank financial institution, and later, became a registered bank in Ecuador.
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Social Capital
Social capital is a significant component in microfinance and its literature, not to
mention a critical element of societies throughout the world. The concept of social capital is one
that is critical to microfinance, as well as to the development and aid industry, and to societies
across most, if not all, cultures. It is a term that is generally associated with the bonds that serve
to unite a community. According to the World Bank (2011):
Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion
is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable.
Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the
glue that holds them together (from: World Bank, Social Development, Social Capital
Library, 2011)

While Stiglitz looks at social capital in conjunction with institutions and relationships,
he examines its importance within markets, especially inside the failure of markets, or in what he
calls an “information paradigm”. Social capital for Stiglitz invokes efficient information,
knowledge, networks, and functional markets (2000). Roy (2010) emphasizes that social capital
can become economic capital and distinguishes between “good” and “bad” social capital. Roy
also looks at the role of social capital in group-based microcredit programs and indigenous
rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) to show how social capital can develop as
one’s role in group-based programs evolves and interacts with other members.
In his essay Social Capital and Poverty, Paul Collier (1998) states, “social capital is
called ‘social’ because it involves people being sociable” (2); for social capital to be capital, “its
economic effects must have some persistence” (4). Similarly, Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett
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(2000) demonstrate that social capital is social in that it has influence from household to
household and that it is capital in the sense that it increases incomes. Social interaction and
economic influence seem to be two key characteristics of social capital.

Microfinance

institutions evaluate potential borrowers based on factors including social capital: the role that
the borrower might have in society (or their ability to be successful in business) and their ability
(or potential) to earn an income. Are these the only factors that can measure a borrower’s
likelihood for loan repayment? Are there other measures that might be considered?

Microfinance in Conflict Zones and Refugees
There have been volumes written about microfinance over the last three decades,
focusing on a variety of topics, sectors and regions. Generally speaking, when there has been
conflict, such as with Kosovo, Angola, and Rwanda, microfinance has entered the region as one
of the “tools” to assist in the economic rebuilding of the region, post-conflict (Wilson, 2002).
One notable exception has been Colombia, where microfinance demonstrates approximately two
decades of history during the country’s ongoing (nearly 50 year old) civil war. Colombia’s
conflict has produced one of the largest groups of refugees in the world: Colombian refugees
typically migrate within their country’s borders, from region to region, and are categorized as
internally displaced persons (IDPs); a subset regularly flees the country into neighboring
Ecuador (Korovkin, 2008). While these refugees have left their homes due to war-related
violence, they find a different chaos in their new country, with very little assistance to guide
them towards a new start.
A number of research reports focus on case studies, looking at the use of microfinance
and related services in countries stricken by conflict, with many case studies leaning towards
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post-conflict recovery (Wilson, 2002; El-Zoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, 2008; ESDWA, 2009).
Additionally many reviews focus on the use of microfinance in the area of development and
whether or not it has been an effective contributor in the redevelopment of the region (Wilson,
2002). Still further, several countries with existing conflict served as the focus of case studies:
Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Through their research, the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia (ESDWA) analyzed strategies in microfinance and development and looked at the
impact on building peace (ESDWA, 2009); Azerbaijan’s service sector was also examined, in the
context of workers who had fled their rural homes for less volatility in urban locations
(Kvernröd, 2004).
Overall, across all regions, studies focusing on locations with conflict seem to be less
common, perhaps due to the risks involved, the costs to fund such projects, and the challenges
related to working with a group of borrowers living in turbulence (Nagarajan and McNulty,
2004). Yet, where there have been studies, microfinance is shown to promote peace building,
lessen dependency on relief, start the initial growth of war-torn economies, support relief and
development programs, improve gender roles and increase self-worth (Wilson, 2002). However,
there is also recognition that multiple objectives for using microfinance has led to great
confusion and that the decrease of providers due to opportunity costs and risks during periods of
conflict negatively impacts the microfinance markets, given the expansion of the informal
business sector during such fragile times. As a result, informal microfinance develops in high
conflict zones, followed by semi-formal microfinance. Essential components for the
implementation of informal microfinance were found to be trust, borrower information, and
market knowledge, whereas in semi-formal microfinance, security was viewed as the most
important condition for program implementation (Wilson, 2002).
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In other research, there was a theme which underscored the need for better guidance for
microfinance groups in conflict zones. It also appeared that additional research is needed to
better determine if microfinance can be used in the mitigation and management of conflict
(Nagarajan, 2004).

Related to this theme is the need for regulatory reviews which might

improve local microfinance groups (ESCWA, 2009), perhaps due to the lack of laws (or lawenforcement professionals) in conflict zones.
Other work analyzes the types of assistance that might most benefit the refugee or
internally displaced person, and whether microfinance is a tool that can assist this population
(Bartsch, 2004; Nagarajan, 2004). Research demonstrates that when delivered in combination
with business training and a pro-business environment, microfinance can be a “viable avenue for
self reliance”; however, microfinance is often utilized as a “quick fix to jumpstart refugee
livelihoods” (Bartsch, 2004). In addition to business training, it was determined that vocational
training and credit training would be beneficial to those workers who had migrated from rural to
urban markets (Kvernröd, 2004).
There has also been review of the effectiveness that MFIs can provide to the conflict
region, which also requires a supportive government to promote their efforts and uphold legal
regulations (ESCWA, 2009). Some view microfinance as a tool to create employment and to
help ease suffering that stems from civil conflict. It has also been shown to have positive impact
on the restoration of social capital that typically erodes during periods of conflict. On the
negative side, there is some indication that microfinance cannot be sustainable nor reach a large
population of borrowers due to the volatile conditions of the region; thus microfinance in a
conflict zone is limiting by nature of the environment (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004).
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Finally, looking at the stated objective of microfinance, poverty alleviation, studies
underscore the need for the MFI to stay focused on reaching those individuals living in poverty
and blocked from income-generating labor as a result of the conflict (ESCWA, 2009). Refugees
demonstrate that they are resourceful and willing to work and to rebuild their lives, if given
resources and opportunity; refugees state and demonstrate that they seek self-reliance (De
Vriese, 2006; El-Zoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, 2008).

Such studies would suggest that many

microfinance institutions neither reach the extreme poor nor work with persons who are
classified as refugees, yet both groups contain characteristics associated with ideal borrowers
under “normal circumstances”.

Summary
This review of the literature began with the story of the World Bank, an organization
that was initially created in order to stabilize and reconstruct a war-torn Europe, post World War
II. Over the decades, the World Bank expanded its mandates to include poverty alleviation, a
highly debated role both inside and outside of the Bank. Many academics and researchers have
attempted to assess the impact of efforts by the World Bank and other NGOs, in order to
determine if their aid actually helps the poor. Other researchers who also focus on poverty
alleviation follow a more market-based solution approach, examining the effects of microfinance
programs on the poor. Most of these researchers draw upon social capital as the binding material
in a society that creates social norms and the quality of social interactions, and use social capital
as one of the criterion in evaluating candidates for microfinance.
The literature on microfinance and refugees is extensive though produces mixed results
given the transient nature of refugees. However there is evidence that suggests that informal
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microfinance develops in high conflict regions, later to be followed by more formal programs
once the conflict subsides. In post-conflict regions, studies document that citizens, generally
extremely poor following conflict, seek training and employment; refugees and IDPs
demonstrate a strong desire to work, with many migrating to urban locations where employment
opportunities are much greater.
Yet, much of the research is inconclusive and raises the following questions: Is there
sufficient aid to assist all poor people who are in need? Can microfinance be a tool to assist the
poor? Are microfinance institutions willing to work with refugees who generally are lacking in
social capital? Might microfinance be a pathway not to “lift the poor out of poverty” but to
extend a loan to a hard-working person who seeks opportunity and independence?
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Chapter 3: Statement of Thesis
My thesis asks the question: can microfinance be provided to a refugee population and
by doing so, would that assist the refugee in addressing their unmet needs? Through a casestudy that examined Colombian refugees in Ecuador, I brought this question into the field to look
at the realities associated with this refugee grouping, the microfinance institutions located in
Ecuador, and the NGOs that service this community.

Background
Microfinance is often introduced to a population that lives in a stable region afflicted by
significant poverty. It also has been used as an economic tool within countries that are focused
on post-conflict growth, during the country’s reconstruction phase (Nagarajan, McNulty, 2004).
Microfinance in Latin America has a history of over 20 years, much of which has been tied to the
work of more established microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as FINCA, ProMujer and
Accion. By virtue of their tenure in the region, but also from the relationships they have built
over time with other MFIs, NGOs, state officials, donors, and others, many Latin American
MFIs also have extensive networks across the region and world, bringing a range of best
practices to their own operations.
The Colombian refugee population living in Ecuador is a subset of a group of persons
who have fled conflict zones within Colombia. The roughly 50 year long civil conflict between
guerrilla groups and the Colombian government and military has produced one of the world’s
largest refugee situations, though the majority of these people are categorized as internally
displaced persons (IDPs), since they remain within the borders of Colombia, typically migrating
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from rural areas to urban locales in search of safety8. However, due to the mountainous
geography of southwest Colombia and the security issues related to the conflict, the people of
this region typically flee to Ecuador, crossing country borders without authorization. As a result,
this group lives in an in-between condition, attempting to settle into their new country but
unaware of logistics and the legalities to steer towards a safe reality. Generally, these people are
very poor, from rural/agricultural communities, and lacking in resources to begin life in a new
country. Both countries, Ecuador and Colombia, have skeletal operations in place to assist this
group; as such, because there is little assistance, refugees face lack of organization, few, if any,
public services, and a continuation of a life filled with uncertainty. Whereas they fled their
homes in Colombia due to fear and threats stemming from the conflict, they end up trading one
set of issues for another, living their lives on the fringe of society, not fully integrated, not legally
seen, and therefore, not granted access into the formal societies of their new locations.
UNHCR/ACNUR estimates that there are approximately 130,000 refugees living in Ecuador,
despite only 25-30% being registered as refugees. Unlike many other countries with refugees,
these people do not sleep in tents or donor-funded housing complexes where they might be more
easily counted and registered; because of the nature of their migration, these refugees generally
live in very informal housing, are not always informed about the registration processes, and are
not easily found in the rural topography where roughly half the population is said to live.
Beyond these refugees of Ecuador and the IDPs in Colombia, there stands a larger
group of combined refugees and IDPs. According to the 2010 year-end statistics from UNHCR,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
!United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2011, UNHCR Country Operations Profile:
Colombia. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492ad6.html
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there were 10.55 million persons classified as refugees and 14.7 million persons identified as
IDPs, totaling 25.25 million people. When adding in asylum-seekers, persons of concern,
stateless persons, returnees (refugees and IDPs), and other people of concern to UNHCR, the
number of persons comprising what UNHCR calls Global Forced Displacement rises to 33.9
million persons.
Looking at the last ten years (2001 – 2010), the number of worldwide refugees has
decreased slightly from 16.0 million in 2001 to 15.4 million in 2010; the number of IDPs over
this same ten-year period exhibits an increase of 10%: growing from 25.0 million to 27.5
million9. Given the events in Africa and the Middle East in 2011, it would seem highly probable
that these numbers have risen. After examining the challenges associated with foreign aid, such
as Easterly, Hancock, and Moyo present, one needs to examine the responsiveness of aid to the
growth of refugees and IDPs: Has donor-aid adjusted to reach new refugees and IDPs? Can the
amount of assistance be easily adjusted - in tandem - with sudden rises in the number of refugees
and IDPs? Or does an increase of refugees stay offline, not counted until some official census is
conducted?
Beyond the official statistics, inspired by the research of Deepa Narayan in Voices of
the Poor, I think of the people who comprise these numbers. I think of the masses that wait to be
counted: what solutions are available to them today? What future solutions are available to them
if they are not counted in an official census? Moreover, what long-term assistance is there to help
our world’s growing refugee and IDP population? Looking at it another way, perhaps more
philosophical and from the framework of basic human rights, I question if these people - the 33.9
million - really count in a world filled with 7 billion people. Putting this number into a more
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Statistics found in UNHCR Global Trends 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html
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local context, consider the following: would it matter if the people who currently live in New
Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware were suddenly uprooted and
deposited someplace outside of the United States with just the clothes on their backs and perhaps
a blanket or two? This combined population- approximately 33.9 million10 – had gone from their
normal daily lives in the United States, to suddenly having nothing, including the hope of a
future. Do these former-United States residents represent people that might have skills, abilities
and knowledge that they could contribute to their families, to their local communities, and to an
economic foundation of a society? Do these 33.9 million people deserve more (or less) of an
opportunity at rebuilding their lives than the (already) counted refugees and IDPs? Or might both
groups deserve equal opportunities in life, regardless of the journey that led them to their current
location?

Research Questions and Hypothesis
With this framing in mind, I turn to a question which is central to my thesis project:
Given the trends of refugees and IDPs and the challenges associated with foreign aid, could
microfinance assist refugees in their new locations? My hypothesis states that under the right
framework, microfinance can be a tool that assists refugees address some of their unmet needs.
Specifically, I approach this question through a case study of Colombian refugees living in
Ecuador to determine if microfinance might be an effective tool to:
1) assist refugees build or expand businesses,
2) earn an income through microfinance-funded business activity, and
3) address their most important needs.
My hypothesis is based on the assumption that if microfinance is extended to refugees,
then those refugees will have an opportunity to start or supplement a business, to generate
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!US population – 2010 State Statistics, http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf
39

!

income, and to be in a better position to address their most important needs. It would seem
logical that the refugee who borrowed from a microfinance institution, and successfully repaid
that loan (and interest), would have also demonstrated their ability not only to repay loans, but to
build and maintain social capital, a critical component for financial inclusion in the formal
banking society. Given that a lack of social capital is often held out as one of the reasons why
microfinance cannot be extended to refugees, I decided to take a divided approach:
1. Identify a microfinance institution either currently working with refugees, willing to work
with refugees, or previously had worked with them, and
2. Examine factors that might allow an MFI to include a refugee in their lending practice.
Additional Questions:
As I began my research, several additional questions surfaced which helped to guide my
research, informal interviews, data collection, and analysis. These questions organized into three
main subject categories: 1) refugee voice, 2) microfinance institutions’ experience with refugees,
and 3) adaptation of social capital.
Details on Questions:
1. Refugee Voice: What do the refugees require: What do they view as their immediate
needs? What assistance would they like to receive? Do they have knowledge of
microcredit? Would they seek a micro-loan and if so, for what purpose(s)?
2. Microfinance Institution’s Experience with Refugees: Are there documented case studies
(positive or negative) where microfinance has been applied to refugees in this region? If
so, what services were provided? What were the results of their efforts?
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3. Adaptation of Social Capital: Given that social capital tends to be a strong motivator in
the extension of loans by an MFI and in the repayment of loans by the borrower, yet has
been shown to break down in places of conflict and post-conflict, would the microfinance
industry be open to working with this potential borrower profile? Are there steps to
building social capital that a refugee might be taking in their new location, which might
be assessed by an MFI in the place of traditional, more mature social capital? And if so,
could these factors serve in lieu of social capital when evaluating a potential borrower?

In summary, I hypothesize that under a specific framework, if microfinance were provided to
refugees, it might also assist refugees in meeting their unmet needs. With this statement, and the
background and questions outlined above, I turn to my next section, Chapter 4, Research
Findings and Data.
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Chapter 4: Research Findings and Data
While I entered my research and case study with multiple lenses and questions in order
to better understand these very complex issues, there were three main areas in which I sought
data:
1. Stated needs of Colombian refugees in Ecuador, and the timeline to meet those needs,
2. Use of microfinance in Northern Ecuador, a region where many refugees are located,
3. Criteria for qualifying microfinance borrowers.

Area One: Colombian Refugees in Northern Ecuador: Needs and Timeline
My findings in this area were generated by two main groups: organizations that worked
directly with refugees and persons classified as refugees either currently or in the past.
Discussions took place with representatives from: RefugePoint, UNHCR/ACNUR, USAID,
Banco FINCA, and community/business leaders in Tulcán, Ecuador.
My informal interviews and supplementary research revealed four main areas of
information. Those areas (1-4) are listed below; details on each follow on the next page in
Exhibit I, Colombian Refugees (in Ecuador) Needs Assessment:
1. most common needs of these refugees,
2. average time frame required to meet those needs,
3. method or avenue required to address the need, and
4. existing barriers that prevent meeting a specific need.
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Exhibit I:

Colombian Refugees (in Ecuador) Needs Assessment
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Area Two: Microfinance in Northern Ecuador
Through discussions, informal interviews and participant observation with both
employees

of

microfinance

organizations

(including

USAID,

UNHCR/ACNUR,

the

International Association of Microfinance Investors, Banco FINCA, Banco Pichincha, and DBS
Bank), and the clients (microfinance borrowers) of Banco FINCA and Banco Pichincha, I
collected data on microfinance in Northern Ecuador, an area that is heavily populated with
Colombian refugees.
Geographically, Colombia shares borders with several Ecuadorian provinces:
Sucumbíos, Esmeraldas, and Carchi (See Exhibit II, located in Appendix). Of the roughly
175,000 persons living in the province of Sucumbíos, approximately 65% of these people are
refugees from Colombia; of the roughly 520,000 persons living in the province Esmeraldas,
statistically there are less than 2% categorized as refugees, though this is a significant enough
presence for UNHCR/ACNUR to have a regional office. The province of Carchi has a
population of 165,000 with 60% estimated to be refugees; its capital is Tulcán, a town less than 7
kilometers from the border- this is also where I was based for my research.
Key Findings from Participant Observation:
1. In late 2010, UNHCR/ACNUR created a partnership with a human rights organization 21
de Septiembre to jointly offer a microcredit pilot program in Esmeraldas. The program
targeted 19 women who are also refugees and sex workers, and provided an average loan
of US $300 to each woman. Thus far, with roughly one year of history, they have seen
consistent loan repayments from the borrowers. UNHCR considers sex workers to be a
highly vulnerable category that attracts refugees who are unable to secure other
employment and/or are in strong need of additional income; additionally, the trafficking
of humans (especially for sex work) is prevalent and dangerous in the area.
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2. Since 2000, several large (commercial) Ecuadorian banks have tested microcredit
programs with refugees in this region: each program was declared a failure because
borrowers failed to repay loans under the stated terms.
3. Successful microfinance banks in the region indirectly support the refugee population.
Because microfinance borrowers are poor, when they seek assistance in their work, they
turn to informal laborers, a group widely comprised of refugees seeking day work (or
longer). Additionally, many churches in Ecuador do work to support the refugees- this
assistance is partially funded by donations by their parishioners, many of whom are
microfinance borrowers11.
4. Microfinance amongst the poor- non-refugees- in Ecuador is common; microfinance is a
mature and regulated industry in Ecuador and works within the framework set by the
Central Bank, including a maximum interest rate (cap).
5. Most borrowers have multiple loans, repay on time, and are motivated to continue as a
borrower in part, because of the insurance and healthcare benefits which are packaged
into many standard microcredit loans12.

Area Three: Criteria for Qualifying Microfinance Borrowers
Through discussions and informal interviews with individuals who work at
organizations in Ecuador including Banco FINCA, Banco Pichincha, and UNHCR/ACNUR, I
compiled a list of criteria used by institutions for identifying candidates for micro-loans. I also
attended multiple village-banking group meetings, individual loan meetings, and office meetings
in which existing loans were updated with new interest payments and adjusted principal
amounts, applications for new loans were reviewed, strategies for collecting on delinquent loans
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
##

!Ecuador’s population is comprised of 95% Roman Catholic; there is regular attendance of mass/church service.!
http://crs.org/countries/ecuador; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html
#$

!While the State provides access to healthcare to all legal residents, there are limitations on what services are
provided, questions surrounding payment (the State, patient, both?), issues regarding crowdedness and lengthy wait
times at public hospitals and clinics; medical facilities are often in locations that require the poor to travel some
distance and at a cost: these are impediments to getting prompt medical attention.
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were determined, and other products such as insurance and savings were introduced and/or
reviewed with borrowers.
Key Findings from Informal Interviews with microfinance institutions in Ecuador:
1. The approval process for group lending, such as the village-banking model, relies heavily
on the trust and bonds between group members. In other words, the existence of positive
social capital amongst group members is critical to approving a new group and any loans
to a group.
2. The approval process for both group loans and individual loans appeared to include
personal testimonies about the borrower from nonfamily members.
3. The borrower’s existing income and their opportunity for future income are both
evaluated by the MFI; in many cases, the opportunity for future income seemed more
important than the borrower’s existing earnings.
4. With individual loans, the stated purpose of the loan was always checked by the MFI
during the approval process. With group-lending, the stated purpose was not always
investigated, as there seemed to be some reliance on the fact that the group serves as the
guarantor for the loans.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
As highlighted above in Exhibit I, located in the section entitled Research Findings and Data, the
most common needs amongst refugees in Ecuador are: documentation, healthcare, security, and
education. Each one of these needs, in theory, can be met, or aided, by an NGO, if the refugee is
willing to speak with an NGO representative in the region. However, in reality, most NGOs in
this region are leanly staffed, are heavily focused on attracting donor/foreign aid, and simply do
not have the ability (or security) to reach many of the refugees who live in the very rural and
impoverished areas close to the border. This interpretation of the landscape is based on my
informal interviews and participant observations, as well as what I saw (or didn’t see) when
visiting NGO facilities and places of work.
For example, it was apparent that money to run NGO operations is tight: funding is
stretched for NGOs under normal circumstances; in the last few years, during the global crisis,
NGOs have needed to run operations on, generally speaking, fewer dollars in response to the
decline in donor funding. Offices appeared understaffed, program cuts were frequent discussed,
and there was an almost constant focus on grant-proposals and new donors. There was also an
acknowledgement of a shortage of personnel who are able to work directly with refugees.
Another reality, though difficult to know if it is normal or unusual, is that there also appeared to
be an excessive amount of refugee cases waiting for attention, and most for a period of time
exceeding several months. An employee at one organization mentioned files sitting on their desk
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which were close to a year old yet were still in the queue for visa documentation - they described
personnel turnover and cuts as part of the reasons for their backload.
Documentation
From the refugees’ perspective, understaffing, budget cuts, and/or the lack of focus on
their particular situation translated into “waiting in line” for attention. It also uncovered the topic
of required documentation, visas and the various types of visa that exist; many refugees in
Ecuador spoke of the need to obtain a migratory visa which is called Visa de Amparo which
differs from the refugee visa. A refugee visa is short-term, relatively expensive to renew on an
annual basis, and does not provide access to benefits such as healthcare. The Visa de Amparo is
longer term and supposedly facilitates better employment and housing; with a refugee visa, the
consensus was that refugees can only live and work informally, generally on the edge of
legality13. However, refugees and NGOs expressed frustration with the visa processing system
that is currently in place in Ecuador, indicating that it seemed like a lottery with “few winnings”:
very few Visas de Amparo are granted each year, with a very small percentage of those are
allocated to refugees.
Healthcare
In most discussions, access to healthcare was mentioned as a vital need. While several
people and agencies indicated NGOs including UNHCR/ACNUR, that provide healthcare in
towns along the border, most suggested that the majority of organizations were only helpful if
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

There is a significant difference in the cost of living in Ecuador versus Colombia: Ecuador is significantly less
expensive than Colombia (gasoline in Ecuador costs $2/gallon, and $16/gallon in Colombia). Smuggling of
foodstuffs, gasoline, clothing, appliances, equipment and machinery is a widely-spread along the border towns.
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Enhanced refugee registration and human security in northern
Ecuador, January 2011, ISSN 1020-7473, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d887ad62.html [accessed 3 November 2011]
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the need for medical attention was not urgent or unusual. Refugees complained that even with a
refugee identification card (from their refugee visa), they had limited- if any- access to Ecuador’s
State healthcare system. They indicated that the “best” healthcare was provided by the State but
that it is only accessible for residents and persons who held a Visa de Amparo. Given the
difficulties in obtaining that Visa, refugees know they need to explore other types of healthcare.
An example of nonState-sponsored healthcare was the partnerships details by
UNHCR/ACNUR. They have developed partnerships with local clinics in order to increase the
number of available healthcare facilities for refugees, subsidize the costs, and shorten the
required travel distance to the clinic. A different approach is the one taken by USAID who also
spoke of partnerships with local services and healthcare providers, but emphasized their efforts
on infrastructure projects such as the building of a municipality’s public waterworks, in order to
provide clean water to a town, such as in the Esmeraldas in Northern Ecuador. They commented
specifically on the impact that these projects have on children under the age of 5, who now, with
access to clean water, suffer illnesses less frequently and as a group, have a substantially higher
life expectancy than previous “under age 5 children” who did not have access to clean water.
While such statistics are impressive, it is questionable whether this partnership example is
sustainable: if foreign donors change their geographic focus in the future, how would additional
projects get funded and completed? How would other towns gain access to clean water and
improve their children’s life expectancy? The answer is not clear to me.
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Security
The reason that most refugees fled their homes in Colombia is tied to the Colombian
conflict and related violence. Clearly, the need for security was not met where they lived, nor
was there a government in place that could offer them personal security. While security is often
used in a broad sense, it can be better defined by the type of security that is in jeopardy: political,
personal, health, economic, community, environmental, and food (McGrath 2011, Verney 2009).
Situated in Ecuador, most refugees spoke of their continued need for economic security and
personal safety; NGOs discussed their challenge of physically reaching many refugees who lived
in the more remote areas along the border (estimated to be half the refugee population in
Ecuador) due to the threats of guerrilla activity and therefore, the concern focused on personal
security: could they safely travel to and from those areas? Between Colombian guerrilla groups,
such as the FARC, that have encroached upon the border territory, and other organized gangs
who traffic drugs and human beings across the border, personal security issues are a large and
growing concern, making it even more difficult for assistance to be administered in this region
(Korovkin 2008).
While roughly half of Colombian refugees in Ecuador live in these rural areas, others
live in more urban locations also inside the northern provinces. In these areas, refugees indicated
a strong concern for personal security, citing stories of brutalities, harassment, and
discrimination because of their refugee status, race (many are indigenous or Afro-Colombian), or
sex; many cited stories of Ecuadorian police and military abuses. As a result, the fear has
become detrimental to the refugee: UNHCR/ACNUR shared that domestic violence and abuse in
refugee communities are substantially higher than average but tend to go unreported because of
the refugee’s fear of the police. NGOs assert that abuses generally will not be reported by the
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victim in cases where the refugee or related family member is undocumented or has a pending
visa (Verney 2009).
While several NGOs attempt to educate refugees about their basic human rights, their
rights as refugees, and where applicable, their rights as indigenous persons, there seemed to be
an acknowledgement that they can’t reach everyone with that information, and that even those
who better understand their rights still have a fear of the authorities. Given many refugees’
experiences in Colombia where it was difficult to trust local authorities or neighbors14, coupled
with the alleged abuses by some police and military officials in Ecuador, the fear of authorities is
very common and deeply rooted, and not one that appears likely to go away over a short period
of time. That said, there was a common perception that obtainment of the coveted Visa de
Amparo would offer a refugee more rights and therefore, help the refugee be more like a citizen
of Ecuador, which, in turn, would include the right to legal protection and security. Given that
very few refugees are granted a Visa de Amparo, this option, in reality, does not seem very
promising or capable of addressing their deep need for security and safety.
While not a concept widely adopted, the idea of microfinance lending groups does offer
the prospect of building security: because each person in the group serves as the guarantor for
another person in the group, a strong sense of solidarity is developed; new members are accepted
(or denied) by the group, not the bank loan officer. As such, the group is formed around each
member and in support of each member, and in doing so, would seem to address some of the
concerns about security, although not all.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#<

!Between multiple guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and supporters of one these groups, it
is difficult for Colombians living in conflict-regions to trust anyone at face-value: allegiances are often disguised
For persons living under these circumstances, safety means not trusting anyone outside of one’s immediate family.
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Education
Looking at another need, I turn to education. NGOs I met with reported access to
education as one of the most crucial areas of their work, not only because of the need to educate
children but because of the significance that it carries: if a child stays in school through grade 5,
there is a higher probability that the child will continue attending school. They noted that often
parents are forced to take their children out of school in order to have them help with their work
or with the childcare of younger siblings while the parent is at work.
Registered refugees shared the need to sometimes “borrow” the child from school but
their intention was to minimize the length of disruption and only when the parent had an
emergency and no other option. Speaking with these parents, there was steadfast agreement that
they wanted their children in school and later, attending university; parents were very vocal
about the need to educate their children so that did not have to live the life that they (the parent)
had. They spoke passionately about education being a main reason they came to Ecuador and the
motivation for settling in a particular municipality15.
Findings in this category clearly demonstrated that access to education is hinged on
registration: without registering as a refugee or asylum-seeker, children are not permitted in
schools. While there are strong efforts to integrate children in schools, as well as to provide some
educational programs, NGOs and UNHCR/ACNUR speak openly about registration serving as
the gateway for education, healthcare, and an improved living situation. While refugees agreed
with these statements, they also acknowledged that having children attend school opened up
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!Education in Ecuador is free to refugees once they are registered. Because secondary schools are scarce in remote
villages, especially along the border, larger towns and municipalities are more attractive for settlement.
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other issues such as discrimination and the increased financial burden of additional expenses (for
transportation and school supplies); they said that these issues, while challenging, were
preferable to not having access to education but that the situation was more complicated than
they had expected.
The Bridging of Stated Needs
Listening to these issues and needs, as well as the refugees’ lament about “better”
problems, as described in the previous paragraph, it appears very clear that the basic needs of
documentation, healthcare, security, and education stand little chance of being met by any one
solution including NGO aid, NGO assistance, and State services. Thus, with little prospect for
meaningful assistance, we see most refugees taking on almost any form of work in order to
receive an income and attempt to meet those needs. An example of the extent to which some
refugees will go is sex work/prostitution, a group which UNHCR/ACNUR views as one of the
most vulnerable.
In an attempt to offer assistance to this group during the current environment of limited
resources, the UNHCR/ACNUR office located in Esmeraldas, Ecuador partnered with 21 de
Septiembre, a human rights organization that educates sex workers about their legal rights.
Together, they structured and implemented a pilot microcredit program for 19 female refugee sex
workers. The 19 women were selected by 21 de Septiembre based on the following criteria:
1) previous interaction between 21 de Septiembre and the borrower,
2) a potential to earn income from employment outside of sex work, and
3) potential for skills training for employment outside of sex work.
The program disbursed an average loan per borrower of US $300. The purpose of each loan was
typically for the purchase of supplies for the borrower’s other job such as clothing for a retail
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shop or hair products for a beauty parlor; several loans were also use for a major household
expense and for an education.
Results through April 2011 show no defaults from the borrowers, but almost more
importantly, the partnership exemplifies a path that NGOs can take to provide assistance even
with their own constraints such as lack of staff or funding. Given refugees’ needs, and the
challenge that NGOs have in the long-term provision of aid, microfinance seems to emerge as
something that might be worthy of consideration. Microfinance also appeals to those refugees
who seek more independence and have a desire to invest in their employment. When factoring in
the insurance and healthcare that are packaged with standard microcredit loans through regulated
microfinance banks in Ecuador like Banco FINCA, there is even more incentive for a refugee to
obtain a microcredit loan: such a loan would not only provide financial assistance in their work
and therefore, hopefully, facilitate more income, but it would address their need for healthcare
given the embedded services that loan contains. What’s not to like about that?
In reality, the challenge with this concept is that very few organizations and banks will
loan to refugees. Large commercial banks in Ecuador state that they attempted several test
programs over the last decade and they all failed. Microfinance banks like Banco FINCA do not
have the skills, resources, or appetite to set up refugee programs; microfinance for refugees
would require additional training and education, as well as more frequent loan meetings between
the borrower and loan officer, a pattern that microfinance banks like Banco FINCA are trying to
reduce, not expand, due to the costs involved with each meeting. Additionally, given that half the
refugees live in the very rural areas, outreach to these people would be difficult as well as
expensive. The pilot program mentioned above, administered by UNHCR/ACNUR, takes place
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in a more urban location in Esmeraldas- an area that not only is easy to access but cost effective
for the organizations, as they have other meetings in the same towns. So, could there be a
solution of potentially offering microfinance to more refugees in urban (less rural) locations
where the microfinance banks already have operations?
Unfortunately, there are still challenges with that suggestion, as MFIs have set criteria
for qualifying borrowers. This criterion includes evaluating the person’s current employment,
obtaining their credit rating (if available), verifying their place of residence, and validating a
minimum level of documentation for country residency. Additionally, microfinance in Ecuador
is regulated and part of the banking industry and therefore subject to standard banking protocol.
This creates a bias towards setting policies that exist in commercial banks- in the banks that
won’t include the poor, let alone consider refugees. As a result, the process for qualifying
borrowers is based on standard commercial bank loan policy. Thus, the process to obtain an
individual loan at microfinance institutions closely mirrors a larger, commercial bank and
therefore seems less viable for a refugee.
However, as noted in several village-banking meetings, there is some consideration
given to personal relationships and the guarantor-structure which serves as a guarantee in the
event of a borrower default (the group would absorb that loan, and be responsible for its
repayment).

Through group meetings, bonds and security build amongst group members;

through the loan, comes the provision of healthcare services (attached to standard loans). Thus, it
would appear that if a refugee would be admitted to a village-banking group, they would be able
to address their need for security and healthcare, not to mention have the opportunity to invest in
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their work (and future income). I would assume that once a refugee is documented, has some
stability and security, they would soon enroll their children in school.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Unfortunately, the scenario mentioned above is dependent on registration and
documentation. Despite the refugee visa being short-term, expensive, and time-consuming, it
appears to be the easiest way for a refugee to become registered. It might not address all of the
refugee’s needs in their new county, but it does provide them with some form of documentation
and status. With this in hand, refugees are at least accounted for and can be legally hired for
work, albeit not all employers will hire refugees even with visas. Despite that, it is evident that a
refugee with some documentation (including the refugee visa) who lives in an urban region will
have more opportunity. From this point, if the refugee could get accepted into a microfinance
village-banking group, their four stated needs would be directly met or improved (with the
assumption that their children would be admitted to school soon after receiving their registration
documents).
What this scenario requires is a microfinance institution that is willing to look beyond
the standard definition of social capital, and consider the steps that the refugee has taken to get to
where they are. What needs to be considered is the work ethic of these refugees, who are willing
to take almost any type of work in order to earn income and provide for their families. This ethic
appears to be a critical driver in motivating the refugee and in assessing their determination to
secure future income; this ethic can only be understood by direct interaction with the refugee; it
is generally the unifying trait in the testimonies offered to describe a person’s appropriateness for
a village-banking group. In short, my scenario would depend on a microfinance institution
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developing relationships with the refugee community and identifying those refugees with this
type of work ethic; it would depend on a commitment to engagement, resources, time, and
patience.
Are microfinance institutions in Ecuador able to make this commitment, or are they
capable of developing experimental pilot programs, like the one created by UNCHR/ACNUR in
Esmeraldas? Or does the fact that microfinance is a mature industry (in Ecuador and Latin
America) stand in the way of its own evolution: is it too large a system, too deeply rooted, and so
well-defined that it cannot progress or be expanded? Or, sadly, does the reality of one third of all
people in Ecuador living in poverty, not including Colombian refugees, serve as the real barrier,
i.e., microfinance institutions need not go far to find potential borrowers so why should they
bother with all the issues tied to refugees?16 Might it be a combination of all of these questions,
when one steps back to consider each issue and their implications?
So what does all of this mean? First, I would suggest that there is a need for
microfinance institutions in Ecuador to affirm their social mission of providing financial services
to the poor, whomever and wherever they might be; I suggest that the poor be inclusive of
refugees.

Second, it would be beneficial for microfinance institutions to form working-

partnerships with NGOs and other organizations that might supplement the required time and
resources required to develop relationships with refugees; this supplemental information could
contribute to the MFI’s assessment of the refugee-borrower and the borrower’s potential for
future income. While not a perfect substitute for traditional social capital, this information could
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#7

!Approximately one third of the population in Ecuador lives below the poverty line.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html
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contribute a perspective that currently is lacking, and conceivably, be positioned as interim social
capital, while the refugee becomes integrated in their new society.
Lastly, I assert that social capital is identified through observation and relationships, not
from a checklist or definition found in textbook. Throughout my research, I encountered many
organizations pursuing initiatives because the money had been provided for that specific project;
I also found a level of competition amongst organizations, hearing them focus on becoming more
profitable, the need to grow certain business areas, and the need to improve procedures that
would increase employees’ efficiency. Yet, I also heard numerous employees who worked at
these organizations speak passionately about their efforts, about the people they serve, and about
the progress of their clients, the borrowers; I saw and heard the pride that these employees had in
their clients. In village-banking meetings and in individual lending meetings, I heard endless
stories about how grateful the borrower was to have received their first loan from Banco FINCA:
how no other bank would give them a loan at that time, how Banco FINCA gave them a loan
because they had taken the time to get to know them and their plan for that loan, and how,
ultimately, Banco FINCA knew their work ethic. Many of these people had been borrowing from
Banco FINCA for years, despite developing relationships with other banks. However, they
continued to borrow from Banco FINCA because of their loyalty tied to that very first loan, for
being given a chance. I also heard these people talk about their banking officer as though they
were a close member of their family; I even heard a few borrowers say that they took out their
last loan with Banco FINCA because they would have felt bad not to renew the loan with their
officer. It became evident that loyalty is also tied to social capital: that a personal attestation
about someone’s credibility builds loyalty which becomes a factor- maybe the glue - in social
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capital, and this carries meaning. In other words, the development of personal relationships
identifies and maintains social capital.
As trends in the world point to increasingly more disturbances, conflicts, and
displacements, it would seem likely that the population of refugees across the globe will continue
to rise. Based on questions that surround foreign aid, including its effectiveness, it appears
unlikely that sufficient aid will ever reach those in need, including refugees.
To me, a world without poverty means a world in which every person can take care of
his or her basic life needs. In such a world, nobody would die from hunger or suffer
from malnutrition. This is a goal world leaders have been calling for for decades, but
they have never set out any way of achieving it. (Yunus, 1999: 261)
While not a panacea for all, microfinance represents a bridge to economic independence and
improved livelihoods. In short, if microfinance institutions developed partnerships with local
NGOs which complemented their skills and knowledge and thus, reduced their individual
weaknesses, increasingly more impoverished people, including refugees, could be reached.
While the first year of any new program is often too early to foretell success, initial feedback on
the partnership of UNHCR/ACNUR and 21 de Septiembre suggests an optimistic projection.
Drawing upon what might be a successful endeavor, what if more NGOs stepped forward and
created similar partnerships, offering refugees assistance such as microfinance? Additionally,
given existing relationships between some NGOs and refugees, why wouldn’t more microfinance
institutions develop partnerships with such NGOs and thus, continue their mission of providing
financial services to the poor while reducing the risks traditionally associated with refugees?
Together, these partnerships might offer a more holistic and sustainable way to meet the ongoing
challenges of our world. While more research is required to uncover the most effective ways of
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structuring such partnerships, it would appear that the only thing that might be lost through the
pursuit of such a model is the excuse of not moving ahead, not challenging ourselves as an
industry, as a society, to further the shared mission of reaching the poor, all poor, whomever and
wherever they reside.
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Appendix:
Map of Ecuador
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